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SHOW ME THE MONEY:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
INTEREST GROUP OPPOSITION TO
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
NOMINEES
DONALD E. CAMPBELL AND MARCUS E. HENDERSHOT
ABSTRACT
Contemporary views of the federal judicial appointment process are
grounded in themes of obstruction and gridlock. Within this environment,
interest groups find fertile ground to target, and sometimes successfully
oppose, judicial nominees that once automatically moved through the
appointment process and ended in confirmation. While interest group
involvement and influence is an accepted fact, much less is known about the
efficacy of these groups in carrying out their objective of correctly
identifying ideological outlier nominees. This article asks the question: Do
interest groups correctly identify and target nominees who are ideological
outliers? The article implements a research design that evaluates whether
those nominees opposed by interest groups are substantively different than
arguably similar but unopposed nominees. The article adopts alternative
theories of interest group motivations within the screening role: 1) policy
promotion, and 2) group maintenance. Using matched-pair cohorts from the
population of Clinton and W. Bush Administration appointments to the
United States Courts ofAppeals the article compares the dissenting behavior
of the matched pairs. The expectation is that, if interest groups are correctly
opposing outlier nominees, those who are confirmed despite opposition,
should demonstrate outlier behaivor in decision making, particularly in their
dissenting behavior. Do opposing interest groups accurately identify the
most ideologically extreme nominees? The answer is a discernible no. We
conclude that there are no substantive differences between the dissenting
behavior of targeted and untargeted nominees. Perhaps more interesting,
the true relationship might actually be reversed, and controversial nominees
are less likely to dissent (and to dissent in salient policy issue areas), than
similar non-controversial nominees. These findings call into question the
function of interest groups in the confirmation process. The assumption is
that these groups are identifying ideological outliers and taking steps to
prevent those nominees from being confirmed. This article undermines that
thesis and proposes that groups actually target nominees in a way that best
* Donald E. Campbell is an Associate Professor of Law at Mississippi College School of Law. Marcus
Hendershot is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Schreiner University.
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serves to increase the membership and financial well-being of the group
instead.
"[M]ore than ever before, judicial selection is prone to manipulation by
forces outside the Senate, especially mobilization and counter-mobilization
by organized interests."
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary views of the federal judicial appointment process are
uniformly grounded in themes of obstruction and gridlock. Within this
environment, interest groups find fertile ground to target, and sometimes
successfully oppose, judicial nominees that once automatically moved
through the appointment process and ended in confirmation. The interaction
of interest group opposition to judicial nominees has been characterized as
the sounding of afire alarm that alerts like-minded senators to the presence
of nominees with outlier ideological characteristics.3 Like other aspects of
congressional oversight,4 these senators rely on the information that interest
groups provide because they are unable, or unwilling, to gather the
information themselves. In essence, the screening of federal judicial
nominees has been outsourced to a number of policy-oriented interest groups
that do the background vetting of nominees to the life-tenured seats on
courts.
While interest group involvement and influence is an accepted fact,
much less is known about the efficacy of these groups in carrying out their
objective of blocking ideological outlier nominees to these courts. Given the
insulation of a life tenure appointment, one can anticipate that these
nominees will exhibit at least some variance within their decision calculi
once making the federal bench.' Thus, this article asks the relevant question:
Do interest groups identify and target nominees who are ideological
outliers? To answer it, we implement a research design that evaluates
whether those nominees opposed by interest groups are substantively
different than arguably similar but unopposed nominees.
1. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme
Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499, 502 (1998).
2. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005); NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS AND
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2005); AMY STEIGERWALT, BATTLE OVER THE
BENCH: SENATORS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND LOWER COURT CONFIRMATIONS (2010); Lauren C. Bell,
Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's Use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary, 55 POL. RES. Q. 589
(2002); Sara A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Congress and the Politics ofJudicial Appointments, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 297 (Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer ed., 2005).
3. Nancy Scherer, Brandon L. Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the Fire Alarm: The Role
of Interest Groups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1029 (2008).
4. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwarts, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 166 (1984).
5. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
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In developing the framework for the analysis, we utilize alternative
theories of interest group motivations within the screening role: 1) policy
promotion, and 2) group maintenance. We gain the empirical leverage
necessary to evaluate these theories by taking advantage of the fact that
interest groups are not always successful in their opposition. We study
matched-pair cohorts 6 from the population of Clinton and W. Bush
Administration appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals
("USCA"). Within each pair, one member represents an opposed but
successful nomination and the other is an unopposed and successful
appointee. Finally, we look at the most salient, visceral, and clear expression
of ideological position-taking on these courts: the act of penning a separate
dissent.7
Do opposing interest groups get it right? The answer according to this
study is a discernible no. We conclude that there are no substantive
differences between the dissenting behavior of targeted and untargeted
nominees. Perhaps more interesting, the true relationship might actually be
reversed, and controversial nominees are less likely to dissent (and to dissent
in debated policy issue areas), than similar non-controversial nominees. The
findings here call into question the function of interest groups in the
confirmation process. The assumption is that these groups are identifying
ideological outliers and taking steps to prevent those nominees from being
confirmed. This article undermines that thesis and proposes that groups
actually target nominees in a way that best serves to increase the membership
and financial well-being of the group.
The article begins in Part I by telling the story of how interest groups
became an active player in the confirmation of nominees to the courts of
appeals. Part H sets out the theoretical model for understanding interest
group motivations to label certain nominees as "controversial": the policy
proponent motivation and the group maintenance motivation. Part IHl sets out
several empirical tests of the policy proponent motivation theory. It also
provides the results of those tests, which undermines the policy proponent
theory of interest group involvement, and raises serious questions about
interest group influence on the "advice and consent" function in the
appointment process.
II. THE RISE OF INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT
The U.S. Constitution sets out the process for the appointment of certain
federal officers, including judges, to the USCA. Article II, Section 2 provides
that these officers are to be appointed by the president and confirmed through
6. A matched-pair cohort matches individuals from two data sets who share certain baseline
characteristics, but experience different outcomes. See generally Daniel E. Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King
& Elizabeth Stuart, Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in
Parametric Causal Inference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 199, 200 (2007) (outlining benefits of matched-pair
studies in limiting influence of model-based assumptions).
7. VIRGINIA HETTINGER, STEFANIE LINDQUIST & WENDY MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A
COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 86 (2007); Virginia
Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist & Wendy Martinek, Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of
Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123,124 (2004).
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the "advice and consent" of the Senate. These appointees serve "during good
Behavior," which in practice has meant for life. This particular arrangement
of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation was a compromise
between large and small state interests at the Constitutional Convention. 9
However, the Constitution provides no further guidance beyond that general
division of authority. Because a successful confirmation requires both
executive and legislative action, the president and members of the Senate
have wrestled over the establishment and enforcement of institutional rules
and norms in this realm, and over time, the balance of power has fluctuated
between the branches.'o
The appointment process has tended to be a tug-of-war between the
president and the Senate, but recently the confirmation game has begun to
accommodate outside interest group influence. To understand how and why
this change occurred, it is important to set out the changing role of federal
courts in developing and implementing policy and how that motivated
interest groups to pursue their policy goals through systemic litigation
strategies, which led these groups to be concerned about the judges who were
ultimately deciding whether the litigation would be a success. The following
section will discuss the rise in the participation of interest groups within the
confirmation process of judicial nominees over time, from an original
emphasis on the Supreme Court to the current interest in lower federal court
nominees.
A. THE SUPREME COURT AS POLICY MAKER
The story of federal courts as robust policy makers traces back to the
Judiciary Act of 1925." Prior to the 1925 Act, almost all litigants had an
appeal of right to the Supreme Court. This appeal of right combined with the
explosion of federal laws and regulations prompted by the events such as the
industrial revolution, the increase in federal crimes (including drug crimes
and prohibition laws), and the increase in post-World War I government
contract and bankruptcy claims' 2 led to "clogged dockets and delayed
judgments." 3 These events prompted the Supreme Court, led by the
lobbying of Chief Justice Howard Taft, to seek docket relief from Congress.1 4
The Judiciary Act of 1925 gave the Supreme Court the flexibility it
sought. The Court was able to select its own docket, deciding only those
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. Felix A. Nigro, Senate Confirmation, 42 GEO. LJ. 241, 241 (1954).
10. Marcus Hendershot, From Consent to Advice and Consent: Cyclical Constraints Within the
District Court Appointment Process, 63 POL. RES. Q. 328, 328 (2010); Bell, supra note 2, at 592;
SCHERER, supra note 2, at 7; SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 358 (1997).
11. See Jeremy Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial Structure: An
Examination of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 1 (2003).
12. Id. at 2; ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 88-89 (1964)
(providing examples of the expansion of the federal government through "[alnti-narcotic and smuggling
laws, auto-theft and white-slave statutes, income-tax violations" which all "swelled the volume of
litigation and swamped Court dockets.").
13. MASON, supra note 12, at 88.
14. Id. at 106-14.
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cases it viewed as most important and worthy of setting national precedent.
To give a sense of how much the discretionary docket has affected the
Court's output, between 1915 and 1925, the Supreme Court docket averaged
332 orally argued cases per term, while the current average is fewer than one
hundred per term." The Act's passage allowed the Court to move away from
docket-consuming economic disputes.16 Meanwhile, President Roosevelt's
court-packing plan and the Court's subsequent "switch in time that saved
nine" foreshadowed a shift in the Court's agenda to cases involving
individual rights and liberties. In the prescient footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products (1938), Justice Stone indicated that while
economic legislation would receive a presumption of validity, the Court
might view laws directed against minority groups with "more searching
inquiry."'8 By the 1950s, that footnote had taken life and the Court was
addressing cases dealing with privacy and civil rights and liberties.' 9 In
addition to the discretionary docket changing the types of cases the Court
could choose to hear, the Court's agenda further expanded in the 1970s with
Congress' adoption of several pieces of environmental legislation, movin
these disputes, which were traditionally left to the states, into federal court.
B. INTEREST GROUPS TAKE NOTICE OF COURTS AS POLICY MAKERS
It is unsurprising that the shift in the Court's docket led to a change in
the strategic use of the courts. When the federal government's regulatory
footprint was small and federal courts primarily addressed disputes between
private parties, policy-based groups had little incentive to concern
themselves with the litigation. Groups were left to lobby lawmakers by using
the threat of electoral opposition if a representative failed to vote consistent
with the group's interest. When all voices are equal, this rough-and-tumble
of the political marketplace results in compromise legislation representative
of the interests involved consistent with James Madison's description in
Federalist No. 10.21 However, problems arise when certain groups are denied
the right to participate in the marketplace or the marketplace is hostile to
their interests. Schattschneider found that the interests represented at the
legislative level are upper-class and business-oriented and the "notion that
the pressure system is automatically representative of the whole community
15. Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking Docket, 53
wM. & MARY L.REv. 1219,1229 (2012).
16. See RICHARD L. PACELLE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA:
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 87-91 (1991).
17. Id.
18. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
19. CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 26-27 (1998).
20. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of the United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three Decades in the United States, 20
VA.ENvTL.LJ. 75, 76 (2001) ("[P]rior to 1970, environmental protection law in the United States was
essentially nonexistent. Of course, there were a few, isolated states pursuing fledging efforts, and there
were common law property and tort doctrines . .. .But there was nothing even remotely resembling a
comprehensive legal regime for regulating pollution of the air, water, or land.").
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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is a myth," concluding that the successful interests "sing[] with a strong
upper-class accent."22
The policy agenda expansion of the federal courts gave incentive to the
excluded chorus to look to the judiciary, hoping that branch would be more
sympathetic to their concerns. Richard Courtner said of these excluded
groups:
[T]hey are highly dependent upon the judicial process as a means of
pursuing their policy interests, usually because they are temporarily,
or even permanently, disadvantaged in terms of their abilities to attain
successfully their goals in the electoral process, within the elected
political institutions or in the bureaucracy. If they are to succeed at all
in the pursuit of their goals they are almost compelled to resort to
litigation.23
Courts, of course, do not guarantee victory for these groups for several
reasons. 2 4 Federal Courts are limited by the need for real cases and
controversies between petitioners with conflicting interests and standing.
Individual litigants may be more interested in resolving their own case than
setting precedent for future cases. In addition, the cases pursued may not be
ideal to further the group's broader goals. 25 To further the analogy, policy
making through the judiciary runs the risk of promoting numerous discordant
voices on a topic. For those seeking policy victories through courts, there is
a need for strategy to select, develop, and litigate cases in a manner that
comports with an overarching strategic policy goal. This type of collective
action requires the resources and expertise that interest groups can and do
provide.
This group-based policy consciousness developed in the late 1800s with
the formation and rise of groups such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"). By coming together and
creating a carefully planned litigation campaign against racially
discriminatory policies, the group was able to effectively challenge
segregation both in public schools and public accommodations.2 6 In 1954,
the group enjoyed its most vaunted victory with the United States Supreme
Court decision Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.27
22. ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960).
23. Richard C. Cortner, Strategies and Tactics of Litigants in Constitutional Cases, 17 J. PUB. L.
287, 287 (1968).
24. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 12 (2nd ed. 2008); see also Dara E. Purvis, Evaluating Legal Activism: A Response to
Rosenburg, 17 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 8 (2009); DAVID A. SCHULTZ, LEVERAGING THE
LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 186 (1998).
25. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 96 (1974).
26. JACK GREENBERG, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
17 (1977); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION
105-08 (1987).
27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 28:7176
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While Brown was a victory for the NAACP's policy objectives, it also
provoked those opposing integration to attempt to vindicate their view in the
courts. 28 Brown was not the only decision of the Court that engendered
organized political pushback. The Warren Court's opinions on the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants, pressed by sympathetic interest
groups, also triggered substantial organized opposition. For example,
conservative circles perceived the Miranda v. Arizona decision, which
required officers to warn arrestees of their constitutional rights before
interrogating them, as hamstringing police.2 9 Other opinions that raised
group ire include Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), holding that suspects have a
Sixth Amendment right to legal counsel during police interrogations, 30 and
Mallory v. United States (1956), holding that certain confessions were
inadmissible if obtained after an unreasonable delay.3 ' In the presidential
campaigns of 1964 and 1968, both Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon
campaigned on the position that they would appoint judges to reverse the
liberal decisions of the Warren Court.32
Successful litigation ultimately bred imitation, and the ideological
orientations of groups rapidly expanded. In fact, the increased opportunity
and incentive to influence policy, resulted in an explosion in the number of
interest groups after World War II.3 3 While the Warren Court decisions
prompted conservative groups to counter-mobilize and push opposing views
of social policy, such right-leaning groups had been in existence for some
time. Epstein traces the roots of conservative groups' litigation strategies as
early as 1900.34 However, it was the litigation strategy/counter-strategy of
the Warren Court era that began to crystallize modern interest group
involvement in litigation.
C. LOOSENING OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS
Operating parallel to interest group involvement, and facilitating and
perhaps even responding to these groups, was the expansion of standing
doctrine in federal courts, which operates as a bar to litigation. There are two
justifications for the existence of a standing doctrine. The first is to preserve
the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches-
preventing courts from making decisions that are best left to the political
arms of government. A high bar on standing means that the court defers to
28. Opposition-which played out largely in the federal courts-manifested in state officials,
states' rights councils, or citizens' councils that organized throughout the South. See, e.g., J.W.
PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN 35-36 (1971).
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
30. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,492 (1964).
31. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,455 (1957).
32. SCHERER, supra note 2.
33. JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS,
PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 36-37 (1991).
34. LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 154 (1985).
35. See generally Lexmark Int'l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014)
(finding standing based on three principles: "the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another
person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the
2018] 77
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elected branches, denying litigants the opportunity to challenge an action or
assert a claim for violation of rights. The second reason to bar cases based
on standing is to prevent those with only an ideological stake in the outcome
of a matter from having access to courts. Standing requires the litigant to
have suffered a concrete harm due to a violation of their rights.
Beginning in the 1950s, the Supreme Court recognized the standing of
interest group organizations, meaning that a group could bring suit on its
own behalf without naming an individual member as a party. For example,
in 1958, the Court in NAACP v. Alabama held that the NAACP had standing
to assert the First Amendment rights of its members in challenging a court
order to disclose the group's membership lists. 7 In subsequent cases, the
Court further expanded the rules and recognized the standing of an
organization to sue when it could show that an action harmed just one of its
members. By liberalizing the standing doctrine, federal courts cleared the
way for newly-forming groups to become lead plaintiffs in cases and pursue
collective policy goals versus those of individual citizens.
In addition to loosening the general standing requirement, Congress also
expanded the authority of groups to sue within the environmental context
through the introduction of citizen-suit provisions. Coupled with the
recognition of organizational standing, citizen-suit provisions overhauled the
role of interest groups in the litigation process. It provided groups with an
opportunity to sue to enforce statutes in an area where the government lacked
the resources, monitoring capability, or wherewithal to pursue a violator.4
D. EXPANDED USE OF AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS
A related institutional change that opened up additional avenues for
interest group influence was the use of amicus curiae, or friend of the court,
briefs. In the early history of the Court, third persons with an interest in a
case, but who were not named as a party, utilized the brief as a mechanism
to let the Court know that third party's position.4 ' With the rise of interest
groups and the expanding Supreme Court docket, the nature of the briefs
changed and they became an avenue for expressing broader policy positions.
An early use of the brief by the NAACP was in Guinn v. United States
(1915), in which the group said that its involvement as an amicus was
appropriate because of "the vital importance of these questions to every
citizen of the United States, whether white or colored .... "4 2 Use of the brief
zone of interests protected by the law invoked.") (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)).
36. Id. at 125.
37. 360 U.S. 240,241 (1959).
38. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) ("It is clear that an organization whose
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.").
39. See generally Jeanne A. Compitello, Organizational Standing in Environmental Litigation, 6
TOURO L. REV. 295 (1990).
40. Mark Seindenfeld & Janna S. Nugent, The Friendship of the People: Citizen Participation in
Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 283 (2005).
41. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE LJ. 694, 694-
95 (1963).
42. Id. at 707.
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to further policy goals became so widespread that, by 1963, "an increased
reliance on litigation as a means of vindicating minority rights otherwise
difficult to obtain through the political process . . . resulted in civil rights
organizations such as the ACLU, and the American Jewish Congress, being
among the most active filers of amicus curiae briefs over the past few
years." 43 Thus, use of amicus briefs to further the policy goals of groups
provided another avenue to influence the Court and further directed interest
group activity toward the judicial branch.
The strategic use of amicus briefs and their impact on judges and justices
has continued into the modern era. Both conservative and liberal interests
file amicus briefs to influence court decisions." There is some dispute over
whether interest group amici are providing new information to the justices 45
or whether they primarily reiterate the positions set out by the parties. 4 6 The
reality is, however, that the number of briefs filed influences the ideological
direction of Supreme Court justice's votes.4 7 With the rise of the importance
of the USCA in policy-making, studies have found that groups also expend
the resources necessary to produce a brief to influence USCA judges, as
well.48
E. DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST GROUP ATTENTION TO COURT
NOMINEES
With the rise of group interest in litigation to pursue a policy agenda, it
is only natural that groups would also be interested in influencing the judges
that sit on those courts. The reality is that since George Washington groups
have viewed Supreme Court vacancies as an appropriate venue for partisan
and institutional fights over judicial philosophy. In modern times, nominees
to the Supreme Court have garnered attention because of the uniquely
important status of that court, including its discretionary docket, focus on
salient policy issues, few members and infrequent vacancies, and highly
visible nomination and confirmation process. For these reasons, studies of
interest group involvement in the appointment and confirmation process
have traditionally focused on Supreme Court nominees 49 and on the
incentives and motivations of the traditional players in the confirmation
43. Id. at 710.
44. PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING 56 (2008).
45. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
participation in the U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC'Y REV. 807, 808 (2004).
46. See James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at
the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365 (1997).
47. COLLINS, supra note 44.
48. See, e.g., Wendy L. Martinek, Amici Curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 34 AM. POL. RES.
803, 818 (2006).
49. See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, supra note 1, at 499; JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING
OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 49 (1998); L. Marvin Overby et al., Courting Constituents? An
Analysis of the Supreme Court Vote on Clarence Thomas, 86 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 997, 998 (1992);
Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron & Albert D. Cover, A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting:
Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 96 (1992).
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game: the presidento and the Senate.5 ' Notable examples of nominees that
were confirmed despite facing stiff interest group opposition include
Brandeis (Johnson), Rehnquist (Nixon), Clarence Thomas (H.W. Bush), and
Kavanaugh (Trump). Three Supreme Court nominees have been rejected by
the Senate since the Nixon presidency: Clement Haynsworth (Nixon),
Harrold Carswell (Nixon), and Robert Bork (Reagan). Two have been
withdrawn: Douglas Ginsburg (Reagan) and Harriet Miers (W. Bush). Of
these nominations, Bork represents a turning point in the role of interest
group involvement in the confirmation process.
While Supreme Court vacancies continue to prompt strong interest group
involvement, the general increase in the role of federal courts as policy-
makers across a variety of areas 52 has heightened group interest in lower
federal court judges. Two events reduced the role of the Supreme Court in
deciding the vast majority of cases. First was the Judiciary Act of 1925,
which eliminated the mandatory docket and allowed the justices to accept far
fewer cases. After recognition of a discretionary docket, the Court amended
the Supreme Court Rules to add Rule 10 which provides that certiorari would
only be granted for "compelling" reasons such as a conflict between the
federal circuits or when there is "an important question of federal law" that
should be settled by the Court.5 This led to the adoption of the Rule of Four,
requiring at least four Justices to vote in favor of taking a case for certiorari
to be granted. Because of these changes, the number of cases decided by the
Supreme Court has plummeted.5 4 Thus, while the Supreme Court maintains
its importance in national life, and vacancies mobilize interest groups on both
sides, its role in rectifying incorrect decisions by lower courts is reduced.
This is occurring in a world of increasing federal court jurisdiction and
policy-making. In approximately 99% of cases, the Courts of Appeal are the
courts of last resort for litigants.
F. THE RISE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF COURTS OF APPEALS NOMINEES
From the perspective of interest groups, nominations to lower courts
have been viewed historically as less important than those for the Supreme
Court, with patronage primarily guiding selection. Senators view these
positions as important to support electoral goals and fight to protect their
prerogatives. Groups understand senatorial protectionism and rarely
interfere, even today, if a home state senator supports a nominee. This same
hands-off approach also applied (although less so) to USCA positions for
several reasons. First, and foremost, as set out above, when the policy-
making sphere of federal courts was minimal it was not worth expending
resources in the fight over nominees, but that has changed with the increase
50. See Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A
Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1071-72 (1999).
51. See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE
CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 65-78 (1953).
52. See H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 114 (1991).
53. Daniel R. Coquillette et al., 23 MOORE'S FED. PRAC. § 5:10.01 (3d. ed. 2018), LEXIS.
54. See David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme
Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 779 (1997).
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in the importance of the lower federal courts in establishing policy. There
were also institutional restraints that made involvement in the confirmation
process of USCA appointees difficult. Until the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913, state legislators selected senators-making it
problematic to tie positions on nominations with electoral consequences.
Furthermore, until 1929, the Senate decided most nominations in executive
session, giving outside groups little opportunity to publicly assert their
influence." However, this perception that lower federal court judgeships
were not worth the fight changed as the structural and political context
shifted.
The opening up of the Supreme Court docket and expanding federal
court jurisdiction created a trickle-down impact on the USCA. These courts
were tasked with both implementing the decisions of the Supreme Court and
defining the parameters of the rights recognized by the Court. As the lower
courts became more active players in the direction and outcomes of
controversial public policy battles (e.g., segregation, privacy rights, criminal
justice, and environmental concerns), groups adjusted according1.5 6 Groups
sought to break into the previously closed confirmation system.
Consider the fall-out from the Supreme Court's decisions dealing with
social policy areas. While the Court established the precedent, judges at the
district court and USCA level were left to interpret the opinion and enforce
its commands. This fact made the selection of lower federal judges an
important issue not just of patronage, but also of politics. For example,
Southern senators during integration felt that if they could not overturn the
Brown decision itself, they were determined to keep control of the judges
charged with enforcing it, and during that time Democratic presidents
capitulated to keep the southern Democrats in the party.
G. USCA JUDGES AS POTENTIAL SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
The Courts of Appeal have also gained in importance because they have
become a training ground for Supreme Court nominees. As of 2004, seven
of nine Justices had served on the USCA.5 9 In 2017, eight of the nine Justices
previously served.60 Thus, in the contemporary chess match over the make-
up of the Court, interest groups have begun to make early moves against
lower court nominees on the fast track for future elevation.
It is rare that groups will come out and publicly assert that future
promotion is the reason for their opposition (preferring to focus on
ideological concerns). However, in late 2003, several internal memos
prepared by the staff of Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and
Richard Durbin (D-IL) were leaked. These memos, often summarizing the
position of influential interest groups, provide frank insight into the
55. MALTESE, supra note 49, at 37.
56. Donald Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT, 35 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
57. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 2, at 312-13.
58. PELTASON, supra note 28, at 40.
59. SCHERER, supra note 2, at 20.
60. Justice Kagan did not previously serve on the court of appeals.
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motivation for opposing certain nominees of President George W. Bush. A
memo to Senator Durbin from an aide noted that interest groups considered
Miguel Estrada, a nominee to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, to be "extremely dangerous" because "he has a minimal
paper trail, he is Latino, and the White House seems to be grooming him for
a Supreme Court appointment."6 Therefore, not only have courts of appeal
gained in importance because of decisions impacting policy, but also because
of the institutional reality of elevation from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court.
H. POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE RULES OF THE CONFIRMATION
GAME
As lower courts both decided cases that were engendering cross-cutting
tensions within party coalitions 62 and began to serve as an incubator for the
Supreme Court, interest groups insisted that lower federal court nominees be
ideologically compatible with their views. Group mobilization also occurred
to defend those targeted nominees or to promote nominees sympathetic to
the counter-position.6 ' This placed pressure on a confirmation process
traditionally limited to the president and senators.
To grasp the challenges that interest groups faced when trying to exert
influence on the confirmation of these judges, it is important to understand
the historical foundation of the selection process. The Senate held the upper
hand in the confirmation game for most of the nation's history by creating
and strictly adhering to senatorial courtesy-a longstanding and informal
norm of reciprocity. 4 Courtesy is based on institutional respect for the
prerogative of individual senators. Under courtesy, if a vacancy requiring
advice and consent occurs in one state, other senators will approve the
nominee only if the nominee is supported by the home-state senators. In turn,
supportive senators expect the objecting senator to reciprocate the 'courtesy'
when an opening occurs within their own states. Courtesy is strongest with
regard to life tenured positions clearly affiliated with state boundaries (e.g.,
a district court judgeship) and are weakest when a position does not match
up to a particular geographic area (e.g., a Supreme Court Justice or a cabinet
position). Positions on the USCA fall in the middle of this continuum. These
are courts of life tenure, but they cover groups of states, providing less
justification for a senator to claim courtesy with regards to a vacancy.
However, senators have informally assigned seats on the appellate courts to
particular states and still make claims on that basis. It is not uncommon for
61. David Von Drehle, Turmoil Over Court Nominees, WASH.POST (Jan. 3, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/03/turmoil-over-court-nominees/03fe6d85-
344b-4486-a089-8d53c1404d81/?utm-term=.d8eeafa39761.
62. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1984) (discussing
the influence of the lower courts on party coalitions within Congress).
63. EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 154, 156.
64. HARRIS, supra note 51; Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The Limits of Senatorial
Courtesy, 29 LEG. STUD. Q. 5,6-7 (2004); Tonja Jacobi, The Senatorial Courtesy Game: Explaining
the Norm of Informal Vetoes in Advice and Consent, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 193, 193-96 (2005).
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a senator to argue that someone from that senator's state should fill a
particular vacancy based on the residence of the predecessor judge.65
During the Senate-dominated era, which lasted through the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Administration, presidents found themselves motivated to swift 6fill judicial vacancies but were constrained by the existing courtesy norm.
As a result, presidents would begrudgingly follow the Senate's lead on the
selection of nominees.67 With free rein to select nominees for positions with
strong courtesy ties, senators sought to further their own electoral goals by
using these vacancies as patronage opportunities and rewarding political
supporters. In this era, political support and electoral success took priority
during the selection of nominees; issues of ideology or even candidate
qualifications were often of secondary import.68 Consistent with the idea that
presidents were appointing and the Senate was confirming nominees on
bases other than ideology, Scherer found a lack of ideological decision-
making for lower court judges appointed during the Harding, Coolidge, and
Hoover Administrations, as well as those seated during Franklin Roosevelt's
first term.69
This inside game for lower federal court nominees continued even as
federal court jurisdiction expanded. The one exception to this was the ABA
which gained influence in the appointment process when President
Eisenhower asked the group to rate prospective nominees.70 While the
involvement of the ABA might have shifted appointment considerations at
the presidential level, the introduction of ABA ratings had few effects on
confirmation in the Senate, where the norm of senatorial courtesy remained
strong. Caldeira and Wright aptly termed the relationship between the
President, Senate, and ABA as the "cozy triangle," an indication of how the
relationship was both uncontentious and symbiotic.7 2
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVIDE
As civil rights issues moved onto the national agenda and political
parties slowly began to take clear policy positions on these conflicts,
presidents were in a difficult position. Democrats were motivated to hold
their ideologically fractured party together by appeasing the solid South73
and the judicial selection process was subject to this appeasement strategy.
The state of the Democratic Party, combined with the norm of seniority in
the Senate, gave southern senators an inordinate amount of leverage. Faced
with James Eastland of Mississippi, an arch-segregationist, as Chair of the
65. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 2, at 20-27; CALVIN G. MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 124 (1981); HARRIS, supra note 51, at 66.
66. SCHERER, supra note 2, at 21.
67. HARRIS, supra note 51, at 79.
68. Id. at 80.
69. See generally SCHERER, supra note 2.
70. Joel B. Grossman, The Role of the American Bar Association in the Selection of Federal
Judges: Episodic Involvement to Institutionalized Power, 17 VAND. L. REV. 785, 805 (1964).
71. Id. at 807.
72. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: The Rise of Organized
Conflict in the Politics of Federal Judgeships, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 44 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
73. KEY, supra note 62, at 315.
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Senate Judiciary Committee from 1956 through 1978, Democratic presidents
nominated judges that would keep Southern senators in the party.
In effect, judicial nominations became side-payments to satisfy these
powerful senators rather than an opportunity for a president to further a
political or ideological agenda. For example, President Kennedy appointed
Harold Cox to a district court position in Mississippi. Cox, an unapologetic
racist and segregationist who gained a reputation for refusing to follow
Supreme Court opinions on civil rights, was also the college roommate of
Senator Eastland. " The end result of this appeasement was the continuation
of a Senate-dominated appointment process with a subtle shift from judges
being selected for patronage purposes to judges being selected with an eye
toward their obstructive stance on civil rights.
The party-sustaining era ended as the parties became more ideologically
homogenous. Southern Democrats realigned and shifted their party
affiliation to the socially conservative Republican Party. With this
movement, Democrats were no longer forced to placate Southern senators.
The Senate itself, long a bastion of norms and rules that empowered
senators with the most seniority, changed starting in the late 1950s through
the 1970s. The once closed, rigidly-structured chamber was altered by newl
elected members who demanded additional access to positions of power.
In addition, with the rise of television coverage of proceedings, individual
senators began utilizing these opportunities to make direct appeals to
constituents and, more importantly, organized interests. President Johnson
once said that in the Senate the president only had to deal with the whales
and the minnows would loyally follow. 7 8 The change in the Senate seniority
rules made every senator a whale, and incentivized interest groups to attempt
to persuade even junior senators to use their institutional powers to further
the groups' goals.
J. IMPACT OF VOTER REALIGNMENT ON THE CONFIRMATION
PROCESS
The change to a more decentralized Senate and more ideologically
homogenous parties signaled what Scherer terms the "modern party system"
of judicial appointment and a move away from the "old party system."7 9 In
this new party system, the balance of power in the confirmation game shifted
from the Senate to the president. As party members began holding similar
ideological positions, the need for presidential compromise to hold the party
74. Id. at 807.
75. STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 272
(1976).
76. See Nicholas Valentino & David 0. Sears, Old Times There are Not Forgotten: Race and
Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South, 46 AM. J. POL. SC. 672, 673 (2005); see also
EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 73-74 (1989).
77. NELSON POLSBY, How CONGRESS EVOLVES: SOCIAL BASES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 13,
22,24,27 (2004); BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 41-42 (1989).
78. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT
CONFIRMATIONS 19 (2nd ed. 2007).
79. SCHERER, supra note 2.
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together was eliminated. The primary incentive became loyalty to the party,
which could be demonstrated by support of the president's nominees. This
coincided with the predominant incentive of the president to install like-
minded judges to establish an ideological legacy on a federal bench making
pivotal policy decisions.
In many ways, the Carter Administration marks the beginning of the
modem confirmation process. Carter campaigned as a political outsider and
as the proponent of integrity in the federal government. He established the
United States Circuit Judge Nominating Commission just four weeks after
taking office. 80 Through two executive orders, Carter instructed the
Commission to "recommend for nomination as circuit judges persons whose
character, experience, ability, and commitment to equal justice under law,
fully qualify them to serve in the Federal judiciary" and "to make special
efforts to seek out and identify well ,ualified women and members of
minority groups as potential nominees." Carter intended this Commission
to move the selection of judges away from patronage and toward merit and
diversity, and simultaneously away from the Senate and to the president.
At this same time, the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 created 152 new
judicial officers-thirty-five at the USCA level.82 This provided Carter an
unprecedented opportunity to reconfigure the federal judiciary. While
interest groups did not have a formal role within the selection of nominees,
the groups were involved throughout the process, providing names both for
members of the selection committees and for individuals to be interviewed
for vacancies.83 The committee procedure, although only lasting for Carter's
one-term presidency, eroded the influence of individual senators and
provided an opening for interest groups to become involved in the
confirmation game.
The creation of so many new judicial positions meant that Carter filled
a disproportionate number of seats on the federal courts. President Reagan
sought to reverse what he saw as the liberal leaning of the federal bench and
deviated even further from the traditional model. He moved the selection
process firmly into the executive branch to retain greater control and to vet
more thoroughly the ideological bona fides of potential nominees. Nominee
selection fell to the newly created Office of Legal Policy.8 4 The president
expected nominees to come to Washington and be interviewed and approved
by the Justice Department." Reagan's desire to fully vet nominees was
consistent with his promotion of the New Right86-a combination of
religious and conservative organizations that became active after the
Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade recognized a constitutional
80. GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at 358-59.
81. Larry C. Berkson, Susan Carbon & Alan Neff, A Study of the U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating
Commission: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, 63 JUDICACTURE 104, 105 (1979).
82. GOLDMAN, supra note 10.
83. Berkson, Carbon & Neff, supra note 81, at 106.
84. GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at 291.
85. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72
JUDICATURE 318, 318-19 (1989).
86. HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT WING JUSTICE: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE OVER
THE COURTS 52 (2004).
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right to abortion. The New Right's primary motivation was social policy
issues (as opposed to the Old Right's emphasis on individual liberty and
economic freedom): "They are against abortion, gun control, sex education,
ERA, dealings with Communist regimes, and high taxes; while they favor
censorship, restoration of religious values, support for anticommunist
guerrilla movements, and self-determination for states and municipalities."87
They wanted judges who would vote consistently with these closely held
values. The mobilization and voting power of this religiously fueled and self-
proclaimed "moral majority" gave further incentive for Republican
presidents and senators to pay close attention to a nominee's ideological
preferences.
K. NEW TOOLS OF OPPOSITION: THE EXAMPLE OF BORK
The crossroads of interest group involvement in the confirmation process
is the battle over Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987 to
replace Lewis Powell. The discussion could appropriately be termed "B.B."
and "A.B." (before Bork and after Bork). Before Bork, interest groups
mobilized and expressed an interest in contested policy issues, but found
their primary outlet in litigation, legislation, and small-scale lobbying of
senators over Supreme Court nominees. After Bork, groups saw the judicial
appointment process at every level as an avenue for influence.
The Bork nomination came at a time of discontent with both liberal and
conservative groups. President Reagan's explicit statement that he was going
to replace the liberal judiciary with true conservatives aggrieved liberals.
Conservative groups, fretting over the large number of liberal nominees
confirmed under Carter, mobilized to ensure the judiciary would be remade
in their own image."
The Bork nomination was defeated with a combined attack on his policy
positions and a grassroots lobbying effort against the nomination. The
pivotal aspect of the Bork contest cannot merely be found in the level of
interest group opposition." Appointments as early as Brandeis were
forcefully opposed. What made it a turning point was that groups learned
how to effectively oppose a nominee and they learned that this activity could
benefit groups beyond the outcome of a particular nomination. 9 '
Consider how the opposition to Bork evolved. The day after the
nomination, the liberal group People for the American Way sent out what
were termed "editorial memos" to newspapers and reporters.92 This was
traditional advocacy that had occurred in prior opposition. Other liberal
groups would be expected to send out similar statements. Shortly after the
nomination, however, the groups established a coordinated opposition. They
87. PAUL GOTTFRIED & THOMAS FLEMING, THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 89-90 (1988).
88. HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE
THE CONSTITUTION 58-62 (1988).




92. Id. at 133.
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met and agreed that they would avoid single-issue advocacy such as abortion
or affirmative action (even if that was what the group cared about) and
collectively oppose across a number of fronts.93 As one liberal public
relations leader put it: "We put out a three-page memo, listing the key themes
and making sure that everyone in the coalition was singing from the same
sheet."94 Thus, a mechanism for coalition building was established early in
the timeline and the resulting strategy was focused upon broadly framing the
nomination in such a way that it benefited the collective of interests.
In addition, and equally important, groups realized that opposition to
judicial nominees could cause the interest groups to become the news. As
Bronner aptly notes, People for the American Way
[L]eamed to use paid advertisements to get free media. Indeed, that
was one of its main goals. By producing a catchy commercial, the
organization itself made news. That is, television news producers were
attracted to the ads as phenomena in and of themselves. They would
do a story on the ads, using them as proof of the commitment of the
group and show the ads for free. 95
In a telling statement that reveals just how much group maintenance
became as important as policy goals, consider this statement from Jackie
Blumenthal of People for the American Way in discussing the Bork
nomination strategy: "Jerry Falwell needed an enemy to prosper. He and
others used liberalism; the Trilateral Commission, communism. So we have
done the same with figures like Bork."9 6 Thus, for interest groups, Bork was
a case study in the benefits of opposition, both as a matter of policy and
prosperity (group maintenance).
After Reagan, George H.W. Bush continued the march toward a
judiciary dominated by lifetime-serving, conservative-leaning judges. Once
again, liberal interest groups gained the public's eyes and ears by opposing
Clarence Thomas' nomination to the Supreme Court using the same tactics
developed in the Bork battle. Although the opposition to Thomas was
ultimately unsuccessful, it provided another opportunity for groups to
motivate the base, and publicize their chosen issues.
L. SENATE RESPONSE TO INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT
During the period between the Carter and H.W. Bush administrations,
the predominant incentives of the appointment process were altered. While
senators focus on reelection, 97 presidents-constitutionally limited to two
terms-are more interested in installing similarly-minded judges to establish
an ideological legacy on the bench. In addition, as Segal and others point out,
having representatives in the judicial branch allows a president to impact
areas of law and policy that would be impossible through the legislative
93. Id.
94. Id. at 147.
95. Id. at 149.
96. Id. at 154.
97. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5-6,9 (1974).
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process.9 8 To achieve this goal, presidents select nominees with an eye
toward their positions on policy. When presidents began to actively and
openly seek nominees that fit a particular ideological mold, interest groups
that either supported or opposed that ideological bent became active.
With interest groups pressing for more influence, senators faced the
problem of how to respond. Would they attempt to maintain traditional
leverage within the confirmation process by enforcing the norm of senatorial
courtesy or would they appease newly activated interest groups that could
impact their reelection chances? After all, the Senate still held the power to
withhold its "advice and consent" from presidential appointees. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, senators selected the path of least resistance to their primary
goal -reelection.99
Interest groups, through mobilization, can have a direct impact on a
senator's reelection campaign. For example, when Senator Diane Feinstein
cast the deciding vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of Leslie
H. Southwick, a nominee to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals by President
George W. Bush opposed by a number of liberal interest groups, she faced
immediate public condemnation. Nan Aron, president of the Alliance for
Justice, said, "[The vote on Southwick] was a test of whether Democrats
were up to the task of applying scrutiny to Bush's judicial nominees."'0 0
Becky Dansky of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force said that gay and
lesbian Californians "are not going to be silent" about the Feinstein vote. 0'o
The changing nature of the process also meant that Senators had to be
concerned about more than just the home-state Senator's opinion of a
nominee. The move of Presidents Carter and Reagan from ad hoc patronage-
based appointments to more systematic evaluations of nominee ideology
meant that there were additional publicly available methods for groups to
evaluate and comment on nominees.'o For example, since 1979, each
nominee has been required to complete a detailed questionnaire requiring
extensive background information, and the responses are made publicly
accessible. These additional layers of evaluation provided a "greater number
of veto points [and] enhanced opportunities to interest groups to participate
in confirmation politics." 0 3 In fact, Senator Edward Kennedy, chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee in the late 1970s, allowed interest groups to
participate formally in the confirmation process by testifying at confirmation
hearings (although this policy has not been followed by subsequent chairs of
the committee).
As the selection process opened up, the back-room deals that historically
determined the fate of nominees during the patronage era became open to
98. Jeffrey A. Segal, Richard J. Timpone & Robert M. Howard, Buyer Beware? Presidential
Success Through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557, 557 (2000).
99. MAYHEW, supra note 97.
100. Bob Egelko, Feinstein Draws Fire Over Vote for Judge, S.F. CHRON., August 4, 2007, at
B1.
10t. Id.
102. GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at 358.
103. LAUREN C. BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND THE NEW
POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 69 (2002).
104. Id.
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scrutiny. These changes essentially nationalized the USCA confirmation
process. Under increased scrutiny, senators no longer relied on reciprocating
courtesy norms to determine their position (at least with regard to those
nominees opposed by interest groys) but now sought to "score points" with
the leaders of interests groups.'0 It is important to note, however, that
interest group involvement did not kill senatorial courtesy. Senators want as
much information as possible while expending as few resources as
possible.10 6 That means if interest groups do not oppose a nominee, senators
will not have an incentive to do so and can rely on the opinion of other
senators (particularly home state senators) to, as Kingdon describes it, to go
with the "herd" and support the nominee.'o7
Senatorial courtesy is crippled, however when interest groups identify a
nominee as "controversial." When that happens, senators need an alternative
method of evaluation. Of course, it is possible that unaffiliated senators could
assume the task and vet each nominee's positions and qualifications using
their own staffs. However, with limited time and resources, these senators
do not have the incentive to expend resources on the nomination of a judge
whose decisions will not necessarily impact their constituents or reelection
prospects. Thus, instead of filling the information gap themselves, senators
rely on sympathetic interest groups as third party informants on ideological
outlier nominees.
Those groups, in turn, make it clear that the position a senator ultimately
takes upon the nominee matters. The nature of senatorial response is borne
out by memos between staff members and Democratic members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee leaked during the George W. Bush
Administration. They provide not only details on the background of
nominees that groups found objectionable, but guidance on how and when
nominees should be handled. For example, in a memo relaying a telephone
call between a leader of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and a staff member
of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), the group encouraged delayed
consideration of a nominee to the Sixth Circuit not only because of her policy
positions but also because the group did not want, the nomination to be
considered until after the Sixth Circuit handed down a decision in which the
group had an interest.'0 8 The memos demonstrate that these groups are
intimately involved in selecting the judges to oppose, and providing
strategies of how and when to oppose the nominations. Going against interest
group positions cannot only impact a like-minded senator's reelection
chances, but could also directly impact support and fundraising if the senator
seeks to run for the presidency. These groups have long memories and play
important roles in mobilizing voter bases.
Once an interest group comes out in opposition, senators have a strong
incentive to follow suit and oppose the nominee. Scherer et al., drawing from
literature on interest group monitoring of bureaucracy, term this as
105. SCHERER, supra note 2, at 21.
106. STEIGERWALT, supra note 2, at 97-98.
107. JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 243-44 (1973).
108. Memorandum from Staff of Senator Edward Kennedy to Senator Edward Kennedy, Call
from Elaine Jones re Scheduling of 6th Circuit Nominees (Apr. 17, 2002).
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"sound[ing] a 'fire alarm' that senators heed, "because interest groups
represent the views of key constituents in the two major parties-they not
only care about the make-up of the lower federal courts but who also are the
most mobilized voters. . . ."109 A senator that fails to take into account the
position of interest groups could find themselves faced with a primary
challenger pointing to interest group "score cards" in challenging the
incumbent's record.
Studies have focused on the impact of the rise of interest group
involvement,"o the evolution of the confirmation process to include these
groups,"' and group influence on senatorial response to targeted
nominees." 12 They demonstrate that interest group involvement in the
confirmation process has consequences-even if a large majority of the
nominees ultimately are confirmed." 3 Under the old system, nominees were
confirmed quickly. However, as the system opened up, rubber stamp
confirmation eroded.' 14 Nominees opposed by interest groups suffer
significantly more delay than non-opposed nominees do."'5 In fact, Scherer
et al. also found that interest group opposition is the most important variable
in whether a nomination faces delay and possibly even defeat.'1 6 That article
found that interest group opposition was more important than, inter alia, a)
quality of the nominee by ABA rating, b) the race or gender of the nominee,
c) presidential approval rating, d) year of presidential term, or e) the presence
of divided government.''
M. WHAT MOTIVATES INTEREST GROUPS TO OPPOSE A PARTICULAR
NOMINEE?
By the time of Bill Clinton's presidency, interest groups had created a
fully functioning opposition machine. The structure was established:
Republican presidents nominate ideological outlier conservative nominees
that liberal groups mobilize to stop and Democratic presidents nominate
ideological outlier nominees that conservative groups mobilize to stop. This
approach works well with Supreme Court vacancies, where all resources can
be directed toward the publicly visible and drawn out contests over
nominees. Problems arise, however, in implementing this opposition model
at the lower court level, where the resource expenditure can quickly
outweigh the benefit of opposition.
109. Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 3, at 1029.
110. Id. at 1026.
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For lower federal court nominees, outside groups typically must make a
calculation in deciding which nominees to oppose. They are forced to be
more selective in their opposition, since not every nominee can be framed as
an outlier. Here, groups are likely to face defensive home state senators with
courtesy ties. The lay of the battleground differs and these groups must
maintain some measure of credibility in order to successfully oppose
nominees.
Conservative groups faced such a conundrum after the election of Bill
Clinton in 1992. The groups viewed Clinton as a threat to the conservative
legacy of the Reagan and H.W. Bush administrations, and adopted the same
tactics used by liberal groups in the Bork nomination fight. Clinton, for his
part, continued the tradition started by Reagan and localized nominee vetting
within the executive branch."" Conservative interest groups mobilized. The
goal was to oppose Clinton nominees and to inflict revenge for Bork, a
classic example of a "tit for tat" game." 9 Thus, the groups developed a
concerted strategy to encourage defeat or delay of Clinton nominees.'
Liberal interest groups in the subsequent George W. Bush
Administration likewise adopted a similar strategy, repeating the cycle and
ratcheting up the level of appointment gridlock further. The conundrum,
however, was which of the nominees to oppose.
Opposition in the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations took
place in a post-Bork atmosphere of ideological screening and fire alarm
oversight. Groups had adapted, from perceiving the courts as a mechanism
to pursue policy goals through litigation campaigns to viewing these
appointment contests (demonstrated by the Bork nomination) as yielding
direct benefits for the group itself. It was during this period that group
formation generally subsided. Free Congress Foundation (the primary
conservative coalition group) was formed in 1977; the contra-wise liberal
People for the American Way was formed in 1981.
By the Clinton and W. Bush presidencies, liberal and conservative
groups (and the umbrella groups the individual groups belonged to) were
fully ingrained in the confirmation contest. These organized groups now
faced an ongoing dilemma: identifying which nominees to oppose. On one
hand, groups could focus on reliably vetting the policy positions of nominees
and sound the alarm only on those nominees with outlier policy positions
that would truly hurt the collective movement (i.e., those motivated by policy
goals). Alternatively, these groups could strategically oppose nominees who
were not truly ideological outliers, but who were being considered at a time
and during a political context when groups felt empowered to attack a
nominee and obtain public credit for the opposition (i.e., motivated by group
maintenance goals).
Whether interest groups are pursuing policy objectives or are acting to
maintain the group has significant consequences for the judiciary (and the
process for selecting the members of the judiciary). For example, liberal
118. Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges
Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 265-68 (1999).
119. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
120. Bell, supra note 2.
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interest groups successfully framed George W. Bush's nominee Charles
Pickering as insensitive to civil rights, which led to the defeat of his
nomination.1 2 1 Similarly, conservative group framing of Clinton nominee
Charles Stack as an unqualified political crony, led to the withdrawal of his
nomination.12 2 Even if interest groups cannot ultimately defeat the
nomination, they can still cause significant delay, which taxes nominees'
resources and discourages qualified nominees from accepting a nomination.
Interest group involvement in the process has effects that reverberate
past individual nominees. There are institutional consequences as the USCA
must have judges to function. The delay and defeat of nominees creates a
backlog of unfilled positions. For example, the situation became so bad
under President Clinton that Chief Justice Rehnquist chastised the
Republican-led Senate in one of his Year End reports during the Clinton
presidency: "Vacancies cannot remain at such high levels indefinitely
without eroding the quality of justice." 23 Delay in and of itself is not
inherently bad. As Campbell notes, there are arguments in favor of a more
robust and open confirmation process:
Opening the judicial confirmation process to debate is certainly more
democratic than a nominee being selected in an efficient, closed
system in which patronage is the primary consideration. Outside
involvement can expose legitimate concerns about a nominee that
might not otherwise be brought to light. In addition, with the
increasing importance of the federal courts in interpreting and
determining issues of public policy, a more vigorous debate over
individual nominees can and should be expected. 2 4
The benefits are lost, however, if interest groups are doing nothing more
than engaging in opposition because the group anticipates it will benefit
financially. Because the majority of lower court nominees are confirmed,
both controversial and non-controversial, it raises an interesting issue of
whether interest groups get it right when they choose to oppose nominees.
Those nominees that withstand interest group opposition and are confirmed
have a job for life (absent an impeachable offense). That job security
insulates these judges from having to temper their votes in the future
opinions they write. We seek to understand whether opposed but
successfully appointed judges are systematically different than those that
have unopposed pathways to the bench.
Generally stated, the empirical literature's operating thesis is that federal
judges decide cases through a process that references their own political
121. Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower
Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 695, 718 (2002).
122. Eric Schmitt, Court Nominee Steps Down in Gain for Dole, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996 at
A28.
123. Neil A. Lewis, Hatch Defends Senate Action on Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at
A14.
124. Donald E. Campbell, "To Advice and ConsenwDelay": The Role of Interest Groups in the
Confirmation ofJudges to the Federal Courts ofAppeal, 8 NW. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 1, 31 (2012).
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preferences.125 We would anticipate that these ideological influences are
inversely related to the level of court (i.e., attitudes are most influential at the
Supreme Court and least influential for the district courts). In terms of effects
related to interest group vetting and the lower courts, Scherer found that the
rise of interest group participation is associated with the direction of
decision-making at the USCA level.1 2 6 In an analysis of decisions of
appellate court judges from Harding through Clinton, Scherer found a
correlation between the ideology of the appointing president and the
decisions of their judges. Scherer determined that a Carter or Clinton judge
was 27% more likely to rule in favor of a plaintiff in racial discrimination
cases than their Republican-nominated counterparts were.1 27 Similarly,
Kuersten and Songer evaluated decisions of USCA judges between
Presidents Truman and H.W. Bush and found a statistically significant
relationship between the ideological direction of the president and their
confirmed nominees.1 28 Nonetheless, it is far from clear if these opposing
groups are accurate in their evaluations of nominees' prospects for
ideological decision-making after taking a seat on the bench. No studies to
date have compared rulings of judges labeled controversial and their non-
controversial counterparts. This article does so with the intent of better
understanding the motives and implications of greater interest group
influence with the judicial appointment process.
III. INTEREST GROUP MOTIVATIONS: POLICY CONCERNS OR
GROUP MAINTENANCE?
This article evaluates two contrasting theories of interest group motives
for the opposition of a USCA nominee: policy promotion and group
maintenance. Our starting point for consideration of these theories lies in the
fact that unequivocal policy victories are often rare for policy-oriented
groups. While victories in small policy skirmishes may satisfy a core
constituency, interest groups require a message with a broader appeal to
motivate its base and recruit new members. USCA nominations can provide
that opportunity. Groups can oppose a nominee in a manner similar to a
popular election or a piece of legislation. Shogan puts it succinctly:
"[P]residential appointments increasingly are viewed as just another political
125. SCHERER, supra note 2; Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 623, 629
(2001); Donald Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy ofJustice: Testing a
Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 673-75
(1994); Donald R. Songer & Sue Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial
Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963, 963 (1992); see also
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 491 (1975); Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986,43 W. POL. Q. 317 (1990).
126. See generally SCHERER, supra note 2.
127. Id.
128. See Ashlyn Kuersen & Donald Songer, Presidential Success Through Appointments to the
United States Courts of Appeals, 31 AM. POL. REs. 107 (2003).
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trophy and the confirmation process just another political battleground."12 9
In this context, the contested nominee becomes the face of everything the
group opposes. The attendant public relations push and realized media
attention can gain the interest group not only a concrete victory (the
defeat/delay of a nominee) but also a justification for the group's continuing
existence. In the future, other vacancies are certain to occur, and the
successful opposition of one nominee provides a recurring basis to seek
public support for the group's policy position and pay the group's
administrative expenses.
Opposing judicial nominees has costs, however. Presidents nominate
numerous individuals to fill spots on the USCA (e.g., President Clinton made
eighty-seven nominations and President George W. Bush also nominated
eighty-seven). Unlike the Supreme Court, where vacancies are few and far
between and naturally generate interest from the media and the public,
participation at the appellate level requires a resource maximization
calculation by interest groups. Each group must determine how it can get the
most out of the time and resources it has invested in an appointment contest.
It simply is not effective to go all-in and oppose every nominee. Thus, these
groups must keep their powder dry and pick-and-choose their battles.
Even if a group has the financial resources to oppose every nominee,
there are other factors that would weigh against the strategy. Groups must
select optimal nominees to oppose lest they fall into a dilemma akin to Peter
and the Wolf. If groups labeled every nominee as controversial they lose
credibility; eventually senators and the public would stop listening.
Ultimately, an undifferentiated shotgun approach to nominee opposition
could jeopardize the interest group role within the confirmation process.
Because members and potential recruits would see opposition as
unproductive, interest groups may lose the ability to prosper from their role
in the process. Given that members do not want their donations going to
activities that have no pay off, interest groups must limit their opposition to
a number of nominees that they can label as controversial and have a
convincing argument against confirmation.
Interest group scholars have found that to understand interest group
actions, one must understand interest group incentive structures. 3 0 There are
two primary incentives that motivate group behavior: 1) promoting a
particular ideological position; and 2) obtaining the resources necessary to
sustain the group itself.131 In the world of opposition to judicial nominees,
each of these motivations can lead to a distinct set of strategies. Importantly
for our purposes, opposition on policy grounds is substantively different than
opposition based on group maintenance goals.
129. Robert Shogan, The Confirmation Wars: How Politicians, Interest Groups, and the Press
Shape the Presidential Appointment Process, in OBSTACLE COURSE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND ON THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS 87,152 (1996).
130. See generally Peter B. Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of
Organizations, 6 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129 (1961).
131. See BELL, supra note 103; TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES
AND THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS (1988).
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A. THE POLICY MOTIVATION FRAMEWORK
Interest groups form to promote or oppose a particular policy position.
For issue-based groups, monitoring and responding to challenges to their
policy "niche" is a primary goal. Groups seek to influence governmental
policies or decision-making related to the group's particular area of interest
at all levels of policy-making-both formal and informal. Groups may seek
to persuade legislators to sponsor or oppose a bill that impacts the group's
interestsl 33 through informal electoral pressure or formal lobbying by
testifying before congressional committees.1 3 4 They may assert their
influence in administrative bodies that are adopting rules and regulations
viewed as threatening the group's ideological position. 3 5 Groups may also
turn to the courts, either by engaging in litigation or by filing amicus curiae
briefs in pending litigation. At the Supreme Court level, groups can also
influence whether the Court agrees to hear a case by filing amicus briefs at
the certiorari stage."3
In the context of judicial appointments, groups attempt to ensure that
nominees with opposing policy preferences are not confirmed."' After all,
hostile courts can turn back groups' hard-won policy victories and more
favorable courts can further new ones. While interest groups are no longer
able to formally testify at hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
they do seek to inform senators about those nominees that present the
greatest threat to their policy goals. Groups carry out their role by vetting the
population of judicial nominees and selecting specific nominees to oppose
(i.e., the sub-sample of controversial nominees). They will then provide the
requisite background information and present a case for obstruction to
senators in an effort to persuade them to act. Interest group leaders anticipate
that ideologically aligned senators will act to further shared interests or face
the electoral consequences of inaction.
In this framework, the primary objective of the organization is not
material gain, but rather to serve the vetting function through reliable and
valid information that helps senators better understand the policy positions
of nominees. This policy-based opposition is an inherently limited approach;
132. Virginia Gray & David Lowery, A Niche Theory of Interest Representation, 58 J. POL. 91,
108 (1996) (concluding "interest group niches - and thus the structure of interest group communities -
are more strongly determined by the internal needs of organized interests than by their patterns of
interface with government.").
133. Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 89, 95
(1995).
134. Roy B. Flemming, Michael C. MacLeod & Jeffery Talbert, Witnesses at the Confirmations?
The Appearance of Organized Interests at Senate Hearings of Federal Judicial Appointments, 51 POL.
RES. Q. 617, 617-21 (1998).
135. Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group
Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 108 (2006).
136. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Litigation, 45 J.
POL. 479,479 (1983); Susan M. Olson, Interest-Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond
Political Disadvantage Theory, 52 J. POL. 854, 855-64 (1990).
137. See generally Caldeira & Wright, supra note 1.
138. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 361-62 (1986); GEORGE WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE
POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 102-04 (1995).
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groups will look to oppose only those nominees that have expressed a clear
ideological preference. This is analogous to the Solberg and Waltenburg
finding that interest groups are motivated by policy success (versus group
maintenance) when filing amicus briefs.13 9 They participate in the fewest
number of cases because the groups are looking to expend resources only in
those cases where there is a legitimate chance of influencing policy. 4 0
Interest groups anticipate that judicial nominees who are ideologically
extreme will decide cases based on that ideology-a position that has robust
support in the judicial decision-making literature. '4 In short, if interest
groups are opposing nominees because of inherent policy motivations, then
an opposed judge's decision-making behavior should be substantively
different than a similar unopposed nominee's behavior.
B. THE GROUP MAINTENANCE FRAMEWORK
The group maintenance framework posits that interest groups are
primarily motivated by concerns about organizational preservation when
opposing nominees. As James Wilson famously said, "Whatever else
organizations seek, they seek to survive." 4 2 Survival in this context is
equated with group maintenance: maintaining the current enrollment base
and recruiting new members. Even if organization leaders would prefer to
solely pursue policy goals, the reality is that they must ensure that their
organization remains solvent.1 43 Therefore, interest groups have to make
decisions that from a policy perspective might not be optimal, but act to
further the fundamental maintenance goal.'"
The fact that groups have bills to pay and do so largely through
membership dues (i.e., larger rolls provide the resources that a group needs
to further its purpose), has two relevant consequences. First, groups must
offer members and potential members something of innate value. 4 In this
specific context, groups can utilize the confirmation process "to show their
members that they are proactive and effective advocates" thus justifying the
member's (or potential member's) interest in the organization and the
extension of financial support.146 Second, groups must be able to demonstrate
success and claim the credit for that success. If a group can show that it has
139. Rorie S. Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Why Do Interest Groups Engage the Judiciary?
Policy Wishes and Structural Needs, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 558, 558 (2006).
140. The vetting function generally increases in importance as you move from members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee to non-member senators. These non-judiciary committee senators will rely
almost exclusively on interest group evaluations and the constituent-based responses that these groups
can trigger. See STEIGERWALT, supra note 2.
141. See, e.g., ROBERT CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (1983); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 6-25 (2002); Songer & Davis, supra note 125; Songer & Haire, supra
note 125.
142. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
143. MOE, supra note 131.
144. Rorie Spill, Choosing Among the Branches: Strategic Advocacy by Interest Groups, 22 AM.
REV. POL. 375, 376 (2001).
145. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-3 (1971).
146. BELL, supra note 103.
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"won" a political battle, then that group will remain relevant and appeal to
current and potential members to fill the group's coffers to continue the fight.
A final factor that weighs in favor of a group maintenance explanation
is the bandwagon effect. Because of the contemporary proliferation of
interest groups, groups must be concerned about losing members or
resources to competing interest groups. This means that groups must monitor
the activities of other similarly minded groups. When a competitor group
makes the decision to go on record opposing a nominee, like-minded groups
feel the pressure to join in the opposition lest the competition appear more
active, obtain more publicity, claim more credit, and reap scarce resources.
If opposition to judicial nominees were a no-cost strategy, maintenance-
minded interest groups would simply oppose all nominees. However,
opposing every nominee would cause the groups to lose credibility with
sympathetic senators. As Scherer suggests, liberal interest groups "firmly
believe that Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee will only vote
against so many judicial nominees in deference to the president. How many
'no' votes each senator has is a huge question for these groups." 47 This
sentiment likely applies equally to conservative groups. Therefore, liberal
and conservative groups alike must conduct a cost-benefit calculus before
they oppose a current nominee.
If the organizational maintenance framework is correct, then groups'
decisions to oppose nominees should be based upon an ever-varying mixture
of policy and non-policy criteria associated with each individual nominee. In
short, interest groups should decide to oppose nominees whenever there are
cues-based either on the political context or ad hoc nominee
characteristics-that predict a reasonable likelihood of success. Within this
framework, the nominee's ideological preference really is just a means to an
end or an opportunity to credit claim upon victory. Therefore, under a group
maintenance framework we do not anticipate a substantive difference
between the subsequent behavior of controversial and non-controversial
nominees once they reach the bench.
C. A Focus ON DISSENTING BEHAVIOR
This article seeks to understand the differences that may, or may not,
exist between opposed and unopposed USCA judges' decision-making
calculi. The challenge is to isolate those cases where they express their own
independent positions. One can identify ideology directly and unequivocally
when a judge dissents, where the judge is writing unhindered by the need to
reach a majority or the need to adopt language that will mollify a colleague.
Justice Scalia expressed the role of the dissent succinctly: "to be able to write
an opinion solely for oneself, without the need to accommodate, to any
degree whatever, the more-or-less differing views of one's colleagues; to
address precisely the points of law that one considers important and no
others. ... 148 It is this individual nature of the dissents that make them a
useful test of ideological position-taking.
147. SCHERER, supra note 2, at 131.
148. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33,42 (1994).
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Dissenting judges write separately primarily to express policy positions
that differ from the majority.149 Judges incur costs in writing dissents,
including the time it takes to write and edit the opinion as well as allocating
staff resources to the effort. However, time and resources expended might
actually be the least significant cost. Panels on the USCA gravitate toward
consensus and the issuance of a dissent violates that norm.'50 The cost of
dissent will almost always outweigh the benefits given that the Supreme
Court rarely cites the dissenting opinions of appellate courts and the
contemporary Court takes so few cases.'5 ' In situations where judges do
dissent, they are willing to step out on their own and bear all the
corresponding costs of expressing an ideological position that runs counter
to the majority. Because dissenting judges are expressing a position that
violates the norm of collegiality, the fact that they decide to write a dissent
is significant. Dissents are by definition a statement of the judge's position
unbound by external considerations. 5 2
Putting this in the context of the above frameworks, if interest groups are
pursuing policy promotion goals and label a prospective nominee as
controversial then the dissenting behavior of the nominee-judge should
exhibit systematic differences when compared to otherwise similar but
untargeted judges. If, on the other hand, a group's opposition is based on
group maintenance, then the dissenting behavior of controversial judges
should not be systematically different than otherwise similar but untargeted
judges.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INTEREST GROUP OPPOSITION
To empirically evaluate the policy promotion and group maintenance
frameworks of interest group opposition to USCA nominees, we focused on
the consecutive two-term Clinton and W. Bush Administrations. Both
administrations experienced significant obstruction to their judicial
nominees and the sampling strategy provides the benefit of capturing
opposition to prospectively liberal and conservative nominees to the USCA.
The focus on these earlier administrations is also necessary to provide
adequate time on the bench with which to observe dissensus. The final year
of the Bush administration in 2008 provided a lapsed period of at least six
years to capture patterns of dissent for all prospective nominees.
149. Hettinger, supra note 7; Stefanie A. Lindquist, Wendy L. Martinek & Virginia A. Hettinger,
Splitting the Difference: Modeling Appellate Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes, 41 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 429 (2007).
150. Joshua Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions
Framework, 31 J.L.ECON. & ORG. 808, 809 (2012).
151. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 102 (2011).
152. Thus, Justice Scalia-a prolific dissenter-could say in his Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
337 (2002) dissent: "Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the
personal views of its members." And in dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008): "The
game of bait-and-switch that today's opinion plays upon the Nation's Commander in Chief will make
the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed." These quotes are
indicative of the freedom that dissenting judges have.
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To identify controversial nominees, we replicated the procedure
followed by Scherer, Bartels and Steigerwalt.'" Using their guidelines, we
identified forty-one USCA nominees that faced interest group opposition
during the two administrations (the controversial nominees). Of the forty-
one controversial nominees, twenty-two ultimately were confirmed by the
Senate and represent our potential sample of controversial-but-confirmed
nominees to the USCA.
We then matched each controversial judge with a non-controversial
judge on a number of nominee-specific and political context variables'5 4
found to be relevant to interest group involvement. Following the estimation
of the nearest-neighbor match for each controversial nominee, we utilized
Westlaw searches to identify any dissenting opinion associated with our
sample of judges through the end of the 2014 calendar year. The searches
resulted in 1,674 observed dissents that were associated with forty-one
different judges. For each of these cases we applied the standard case type,
issue type, and direction coding established by the U.S. Court of Appeals
Database.' For the final sample estimates, we were forced to exclude three
pairs of judges due to an early termination event (i.e., death, resignation, or
taking senior status) of one of the matched cohorts. 56 Thus, the time series
considers the dissent activity of nineteen controversial labeled judges and
nineteen matched pair judges (see Table 1 below). For each pair, we
calculated the minimum service period and created a uniform timeframe for
comparing dissent frequency. Each of the nineteen pairs had at least six years
of observation and some pairs provided as many as eighteen years.
153. Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 3.
154. Variables matched on include gender (male 0, female 1); race or ethnicity (a dichotomous
control for African American, Asian, or Latino/a nominees); ABA rating (a dichotomous control for
"not qualified," "qualified" or "well qualified" ratings); appointing president (Clinton 0, Bush 1); circuit
(a dichotomous variable for each circuit); the nomination year (a continuous variable from 1992 to
2008); the year in the presidential term of the nomination (coded I through 8); the number of home
state senators not of the party of the president (from 0 to 2); whether there was divided government at
the time of the nominee's initial nomination (0 unified, 1 divided) and the absolute ideological distance
between the president and most distant home state senator on Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) interparty
and intraparty dimensions.
155. DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2003).
156. The three pairs omitted included Lee Sarokin/Charles R. Wilson because Sarokin retired two
years after receiving his commission; Susan Nielson/Dennis Shedd because Nielson died a month after
receiving her commission; and Franklin Van Antwerpenffimothy Tymkovich because Van Antwerpen
assumed senior status two years after receiving his commission.
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in controversial cases and less often in the expected partisan-ideological
direction. Finally, the makeup of the assigned panel does not appear to
change this result. Looking only at those dissents issued from a partisan
minority position (i.e., the whistleblower context), we find that controversial
labeled judges issued fewer separate opinions than their noncontroversial
counterparts who were not targeted by interest groups.
B. CONTROVERSIAL NOMINEES AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF DISSENT
The graphical analysis of dissent casts some doubt on the viability of the
policy proponent theory of interest group opposition, but it does not provide
inferential support for either the policy or group maintenance perspectives.
To provide more rigorous leverage on the research question, this section
attempts to draw inferences through negative binomial event count models
that evaluate the likelihood of dissent activity behavior after controlling for
the ideological characteristics of the judge, the prevailing circuit, and the
Supreme Court.
We begin with the sample of data depicted above: the nineteen pairs of
controversial and matched-pair judges that participated in at least six
calendar years of service on courts of appeal. To provide fully balanced panel
data, and to eliminate estimation issues involving missing data, we limited
this event count sample to the first six calendar years of service for each
judge. The sample period runs from the beginning of the calendar year after
receiving their commission through the end of the sixth calendar year of
service. In this instance, then, we have a cross-sectional time series of six
service years for thirty-eight judges, yielding 228 observations of annual
dissent counts. The six-year sample captures a total of 761 dissenting
opinions.
To assess systematic differences in the likelihood of issuing a dissent,
we utilize four unique dependent variables. First, we consider the aggregate
number of dissents by the controversial appointees and their matches (Figure
1). Second, we look at dissents in criminal and civil liberties cases where we
anticipate that ideological outlier judges should be more frequently be
writing separately (see Figure 2). Third, we look only at those dissents that
emerge with an ideological direction consistent with partisan-ideological
expectations (i.e., Democratic appointee dissents in a liberal direction and
Republican appointee dissents in a conservative direction; Figure 3). Fourth,
we test a hypothesis related to dissents when the judge is in a whistleblower
situation (Figure 4) by calculating and modeling the number of dissents when
the sample judge is the only Democratic/Republican appointee on the panel.
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
To operationalize the policy proponent hypothesis, we include a
dichotomous variable that simply identifies controversial labeled judge
versus the matched pair judge. This will capture any systematic differences
in the dissent patterns that may exist between successful controversial and
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noncontroversial judges. Parameter results and tests of significance will be
used to evaluate the viability of the policy proponent hypothesis.'6
Given that the data takes the form of aggregated annual event counts, the
adoption of an alternative control variable is to some extent limited within
this particular analysis. Since judge-specific annual counts act as the unit of
analysis, we are unable to control for specific case level characteristics such
as issue types or collegial relationships amongst different panels. Data about
the annual agenda constructions of the USCA are not available, but neutral
criteria of case assignment and rotation of judges among panels does help
reduce potential bias in issue distribution and collegial effects.
The event count analysis thus requires independent variables with an
annual unit of analysis. The ideal point position data available through
Epstein et al.'s Judicial Common Space provides precisely the data
needed.161 The first independent variable controls for differences in the
ideology between the dissenting judge and their circuit. The second variable
controls for the difference in ideology between the judge's circuit and the
U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, we control first for the circuit median for
the year in which the case was decided. We then control for the absolute
distance between that median and the individual judge's common space
position. These two variables control for any variance in dissent related to
the liberal or conservative leanings of the circuit and the judge's relative
position within that circuit.
Moving up a level (but still using the Judicial Common Score measures),
the third independent variable controls for the annual median position of the
U.S. Supreme Court. The fourth independent variable controls for the
absolute distance between the circuit median and the Supreme Court median.
These last two variables similarly control for the liberal or conservative
balance of preferences on the Supreme Court and the position of the judge's
circuit relative to the Court. With these control variables in place we test for
systematic differences in the dissenting activity of controversial judges
versus non-controversial judges after accounting for the ideological context
of the appellate hierarchy surrounding these judges.
D. RESULTS OF THE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS
Estimation results can be found in Table 2. In each model specification,
the parameter result associated with controversial judges is insignificant and
160. In this configuration, the null hypothesis is that no systematic difference in dissent activity
exists between controversial labeled judges and otherwise similar judges. While the null position
generally is consistent with that of a group maintenance framework-interest groups target those
nominees with characteristics that suggest success and credit claiming opportunities are likely (not
ideological policy screening), we must be clear that the failure to reject the null hypothesis does not
provide inferential support for the group maintenance hypothesis. Null results are not evidence of
conclusive relationships. If we had some a priori evidence of the magnitude of the policy proponent
relationship it would be possible to conduct an inferential test that the observed relationships are
significantly different than that a priori value. This would in essence provide inferential leverage that
the relationship is actually zero. In the absence of that information, however, we are not able to draw
clear inferential results on the viability of the policy proponent hypothesis but can only suggest that null
results are generally consistent with group maintenance theories of group opposition.
161. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007).
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exhibits no discernible relationship after controlling for the ideological
position of the judge, the circuit and the Supreme Court. We find no evidence
of systematic differences in controversial labeled judges' dissenting patterns
within aggregate dissent counts, dissents associated with civil liberties
issues, dissents that match partisan-ideological expectations, nor dissents
from a minority whistleblower position. The controversial judge parameter
does turn to the anticipated positive direction in the last model specification
associated with the whistleblower dissents, but that parameter result is the
weakest of all the presented model specifications and is not informative in
any sense.
In short, we find no evidence at all that is consistent with the "fire
alarm" 162 or policy proponent view of interest group participation in the
judicial appointment process. These series of null findings are generally
consistent with the group maintenance view of interest group participation,
but null findings are not indicative of conclusive results. We cannot confirm
that group maintenance theories explain the likelihood of USCA dissent
frequency. We can merely say the lack of significant results are consistent
with the expectations of the theory.
162. Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 3.
163. See BELL, supra note 103, at 69; MOE, supra note 131.
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There are, however, significant relationships to be found within the
alternative ideological controls. Throughout the four models, the median
position of the Supreme Court is significantly associated with the likelihood
of USCA judges' dissent counts. Here, the relationship suggests that
appellate court judges issue fewer dissents as the Supreme Court leans more
conservative. The result might suggest that a more conservative Court may
be less active in responding to the visible cues of circuit conflicts at the
certiorari stage, which suppresses one justification for dissenting!64
Alternatively, the result could suggest that more conservative Courts
generally engage in less aggressive stances toward compliance activity (e.g.,
the Rehnquist Court's decline in case load).
Looking at the last two specifications in Table 2, ideologically consistent
dissents and whistleblower dissents, we find positive relationships associated
with the preferences of the USCA judges. The parameter controls for the
absolute difference between the judge's ideal point and the circuit median,
meaning ideologically dissimilar judges are more prone to issue dissents.
This result here is intuitive and would certainly match existing expectations.
In terms of dissents that are ideologically consistent or those stemming from
a minority position on a three judge panel, we find that more ideologically
distant judges are more likely to be writing separately.
The results of the negative binomial event count specifications force us
to accept the null hypothesis that no systematic difference exists between
those USCA judges previously labeled as controversial and their nearest
neighbor (noncontroversial) match, and is more consistent with the group
maintenance framework of interest group participation within the judicial
165appointment process.
E. CONTROVERSIAL NOMINEES AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF
IDEOLOGICALLY CONSISTENT DISSENTS
The empirical evidence indicates that the policy proponent framework
has no support when considering annual event count data. However, the case
specific information collected on each dissent provides the opportunity to
perform another analysis that considers the likelihood that dissents are
consistent with partisan-ideological expectations. For this particular analysis
the dependent variable (dissent direction) has three ordinal categories: -1
(dissent is opposite of partisan expectation), 0 (dissent is unclear or
ideologically neutral), and 1 (dissent is consistent with partisan expectation).
Dissenting in an expected direction means that a Republican appointee
should be writing dissents with conservative policy stances and a Democratic
appointee should be writing dissents with liberal policy stances. Looking at
the dissenting behavior over the 1,674 cases studied, the aggregate numbers
indicate that the studied judges are dissenting in the expected direction in
1,141 (68%) cases when they issued a dissent. These judges issued dissents
counter to the expected direction in 351 (21%) of the cases, and issued
164. PERRY, supra note 52, at 252.
165. It is important to stress again that this null result does not indicate the absence of a
relationship between those controversial and non-controversial nominees/judges.
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ideologically neutral or unclear dissents in 182 (11%) of the cases. Because
this analysis is concerned with the individual decision-making calculus and
not the likelihood of an event, the sample is not limited to those with a
sufficient number of years of service. Thus, the ordered logical regression
considers all twenty-two pairs of judges where both members of the pair
were confirmed.
F. CONTROVERSIAL NOMINEE CONTROL
The primary independent variable of interest again is whether the judge
was labeled as controversial, but it is interacted with a number of
independent variables to assess whether the controversial label has a
combined effect associated with alternative explanations and control
strategies. These interactions are constructed with variables associated with
whistleblower panels, dissenting judge-panel median distances, specific
issue types, and temporal changes in ideological dissent patterns.
These additional interactions will yield inferences about additive
relationships between the two control variables. For example, the
combination of the controversial and whistleblower controls allows us to
evaluate whether there is an additive relationship for those controversial
nominees found in the minority of a three-judge panel. The model first
controls for the controversial label and then separately for the minority panel
position. It then controls for the concurrence of both situations to see if there
is an additional significant effect. This allows us to evaluate whether
controversial labeled judges act differently than their non-controversial
match in certain defined situations and provides a robust test of the policy
proponent hypothesis.
G. BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION
We begin with a baseline model specification that focuses on
independent variables associated with the origin of the decision being
appealed. The baseline specification includes a series of dichotomous control
variables associated with appeals that were initially heard by: 1) specialty
federal courts; 2) state courts; or 3) federal agency decisions. This leaves
appeals of USDC decisions (or those of federal magistrates) as the
uncontrolled null specification.
The baseline specification then incorporates several control variables
that address the aspect of the decision being appealed. These dichotomous
variables identify questions associated with different stages of the lower
court decision-making process. We control for: 1) pretrial matters such as
injunctions, interlocutory appeals, and mandamus questions; 2) summary
judgments and dismissals; 3) questions associated with plea bargains; 4)
post-trial matters such as attorney fees, costs, damages and settlement orders;
and 5) other miscellaneous questions that did not involve a trial outcome.
This series of variables leaves the uncontrolled null specification as the
outcome of bench or jury trials.
The last two variables in the baseline specification address outside
amicus brief participation and effects associated with the power of judicial
review. We include a continuous variable for the natural log of the number
110 [Vol. 28:71
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of amicus briefs filed before the circuit court to assess the effects of outside
participation within the case. We also include a dichotomous control that
identifies whether the USCA decision containing the dissent includes a
finding of unconstitutionality. This captures any difference associated with
USCA panel majorities that exercised the power of judicial review and struck
down an action or outcome.
With these series of control variables in place the null specification of
the baseline model is clear and intuitive. The uncontrolled category is
represented by appeals associated with single judge USDC trial outcomes
that had no amicus participation and that did not result in a finding of
unconstitutionality at the USCA level.
H. PARTISAN AND IDEOLOGICAL MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
In addition to the baseline model specification, we tested two separate
model specifications with alternative strategies that control for the
ideological context surrounding these judges' dissents. We operationalized
this through a simple partisan strategy related to Cross and Tiller's
whistleblower thesis. 6 6 We include a dichotomous variable identifying
decisions wherein the dissenting judge was on a panel with two opposing
party appointees (i.e., the dissenting judge was potentially in the minority).
We also interacted this variable with the controversial identifier to determine
whether controversial labeled judges have a greater propensity to express
their ideological stance when they were on their own from a partisan
standpoint.
The second model specification uses continuous measures of ideology
to control for the ideological context of the USCA decision. Using the
Judicial Common Space ideal point values of each USCA judge, we first
control for the ideological disparity of the three-judge panel. We include a
continuous independent variable associated with standard deviation of
preference points on the panel. We then introduce an absolute distance
calculation that controls for the distance between the dissenting judge's ideal
point and the panel median. This latter distance measure is interacted with
the controversial identifier to evaluate whether those judges were more likely
to take ideologically consistent stances in more polarized panel settings.
I. ISSUE TYPE SPECIFICATION
Building on the results of the continuous ideological model
specification, we then introduce additional independent variables that control
for differences in likelihood of dissent direction on the basis of particular
issue types. We include three dichotomous controls that identify: 1) criminal
issue types; 2) an umbrella category of civil liberties and rights cases that
166. Cross & Tiller, supra note 158.
167. Epstein, supra note 161.
168. For panels that included judges from federal specialty courts sitting by designation (i.e., U.S.
Court of International Trade), we used the Poole and Rosenthal presidential ideology score as a proxy
for the judge's ideological ideal point. See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997).
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included civil rights, First Amendment, due process, and privacy issue types;
and 3) a final category of federalism and miscellaneous issue types. This
configuration leaves union and economic activity as the uncontrolled null
category.
We also introduced interactive variables that control for controversial
labeled judges hearing these three issue categories. This will allow us to
distinguish whether controversial labeled judges are more likely to take
ideologically consistent positions when they hear controversial issue types
(i.e., criminal, civil liberties and rights, and federalism or miscellaneous
issues).
J. SUPREME COURT ELEVATION SPECIFICATION
The final model specification evaluates the premise that controversial
labeled judges are more likely to be attacked by interest groups because they
are seen as viable candidates for elevation to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
notion here is that the patterns in aggregate dissent found above (see Figures
1, 2, and 3) are likely related to judges who are hoping to insulate themselves
from yet another confirmation contest for the Supreme Court.
If it is the case that these controversial labeled judges are holding their
pens in order to obfuscate their true ideological leanings, then we should find
a systematic amount of temporal variance within the likelihood of dissent
direction over time. As the judge spends more time on the USCA bench and
the window for elevation closes we anticipate that they no longer seek to
insulate themselves from criticism and more feel free to express their policy
positions through dissents.
To test this aging-out hypothesis, we again started with the continuous
ideology specification and added a continuous temporal counter that
represented the natural log of the number of years of service on the USCA
bench. This control will evaluate whether all the judges exhibit temporal
variance in their directional dissents, but we also included an interaction
variable with the controversial label to evaluate whether these controversial
labeled judges change at a substantively different rate than their matched pair
cohorts.
K. BASELINE MODEL RESULTS
The baseline model estimates can be found in the left hand column of
Table 3, where we find a null result for the controversial labeled judge
identifier. In this instance, the standard error term is greater than the
parameter estimate, suggesting that the parameter magnitude and direction
are indeterminate. On that basis we are left to accept the null hypothesis that
there is no substantive difference between the ideological consistency of
controversial labeled judges' dissents versus their matched pair. Thus, we
find no statistical support for the policy proponent theory of group opposition
during confirmation. Again, this result is consistent with the group
maintenance hypothesis, but does not necessarily confirm it.
Whereas the controversial variable is not statistically significant, the
baseline model does provide some useful insights on the likelihood of dissent
[Vol. 28:71112
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direction. Independent variables associated with the court of origin offer
some marginal evidence (p < .10 single-tailed) that cases emerging from
federal specialty courts and federal agency rulings are less likely to be
associated with an ideologically consistent dissent. Two of the variables
relating to the type of appeal being heard meet traditional levels of
significance (p < .05 level two-tailed) however. Those dissents involving
pretrial matters and those involving summary judgment or dismissals were
both less likely to conform with a priori partisan-ideological expectations.
Null findings are associated with other appeal types such as plea bargains,
post-trial matters and other motions.
The control associated with the number of amicus briefs filed at the
USCA level shows a null result, but those USCA cases that involved an
unconstitutional finding of law were significantly more likely to elicit an
ideologically consistent dissent. The parameter result is reasonably robust (p
< .01 two-tailed) and intuitive since it suggests that our sample of judges
were more likely to publish conflicting rationale when the majority has
exercised the power of judicial review.
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal
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The baseline model thus indicates that the court of origin, the nature of
the appeal, and judicial review can explain some of the variance in the
likelihood of our sample of judges taking ideologically consistent positions
within their dissents. Nevertheless, the predictive value of the overall model
should not be overstated. The baseline model specification is not necessarily
a strong predictor of dissent direction. As we will see, the models perform
substantially better once we introduce controls related to the ideological
composition of the panel and the issue types of the cases.
L. PARTISAN AND IDEOLOGICAL MODEL RESULTS
The partisan whistleblower specification is found in the middle column
of Table 3 and it controls for the partisan makeup of the three-judge panels.
Even after controlling for the partisan make up of these panels, the key
independent variable that controls for controversial labeled judges remains
insignificant. The standard error term continues to be greater than the
estimate, suggesting that the result is uninformative.
The new variable testing whether judges dissent differently when they
are in a potential partisan minority is significantly different than zero
(p<.00 1). This robust finding suggests that panel composition clearly affects
judges' dissent calculi. We find strong support for Cross and Tiller's
whistleblower thesis,'1 69 but it is not necessarily a factor that operates
differently between controversial-labeled judges and the judge's matched
pair. The interactive variable controlling for those controversial labeled
judges found in whistleblower situations is not significant. The standard
error value is smaller than the parameter estimate, but the result does not
approach even the most relaxed standards of statistical inference. The
parameter is positive in direction but the result is so marginal as to not yield
any substantive conclusion.
The inclusion of the partisan whistleblower control does tend to improve
the performance of the other specified control variables. The two origin
variables controlling for specialty federal courts (p < .10 single-tailed) and
federal agency decisions (p < .05 single-tailed) yield negative and marginally
significant results. Appeals of pretrial matters (p < .05 two-tailed) and
summary judgments or dismissals (p < .05 two-tailed) improve slightly with
the panel composition control. The positive association between
unconstitutional findings and ideologically consistent dissents remains
undisturbed by the alternative model specification.
In general, the model performs much better than the baseline
specification. The addition of the panel composition controls results in a
substantial reduction in the likelihood function (i.e., a 44 point reduction in
the log likelihood value from -1376 to -1332). The Wald value associated
with the overall model shows an increase that now yields a significant result
at the highest p < .001 level. On the whole, then, the inclusion of the partisan
controls for panel composition had the desired effect of improving our
knowledge of dissent direction. It did not, however, act to confirm the policy
169. Cross & Tiller, supra note 158.
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proponent theory of group opposition in any sense. The results continue to
be more consistent with the group maintenance theory of group opposition,
but are not conclusive proof of that hypothesis.
The alternative ideological specification is set out in right hand column
of Table 3 and evaluates the effects of continuous ideological measures on
the likelihood of a judge dissenting in the anticipated ideological direction.
All of the baseline variables are retained and the two new variables are added
along with an interaction term.
After controlling for the ideological composition of the three judge
USCA panel with more refined continuous measures of judges' preference
points, the specification continues to exhibit null findings with respect to the
primary independent variable: the controversial judge identifier. More
importantly however, this particular model makes the finding clear cut. In
this specification, the associated parameter estimate is exactly .00 and the
resulting standard error term of .14 generates a p < .99 level of inference.
That is fairly indicative of the weakness of the controversial label, but again
null results are not conclusive of the null hypothesis. This result tends to
undermine the notion that controversial labels and interest group opposition
are valid indicators of a nominee's outlier ideological characteristics.
The new continuous ideology controls in turn are very robust performers.
The ideological disparity of the three-judge panel is positive and significant
at the most stringent (p < .001 two-tailed level). Likewise, the measure of
absolute distance between the dissenting judge and the panel median is
positive and significantly different at the highest probability level. Both
panel disparity and dissenter polarity are more likely to be associated with
ideologically consistent policy stances within the sample of judges. These
values easily allow us to reject the null hypothesis that ideological context
of the panel is not associated with the directional consistency of dissenting
opinions.
Nonetheless, the interaction between the absolute distance calculation
and the controversial judge identifier is not informative. Again, the standard
error term is greater than the associated parameter estimate, meaning that we
must accept the null hypothesis that the combined effect of the controversial
label and ideological polarity is zero. This really is the most on point test of
the policy proponent hypothesis. The control strategy would suggest that
controversial labeled judges should be more likely to be taking consistent
ideological stances in their dissents when they are ideologically isolated from
the rest of the panel. The null result found here fails to confirm this premise
and continues to call into question the viability of the policy proponent
hypothesis. If interest groups are targeting ideological outliers, then that
outlier status should be most prominent when the judge sits on a panel of
judges farthest from their ideological ideal point. The inferential evidence
simply does not back up that position.
The inclusion of the more accurate ideological controls refines several
of the other parameter results. The origin of an appeal from a federal agency
maintains significance at the p < .05 (two-tailed) probability. The nature of
the appeal variables controlling for pretrial matters and summary judgment
diminish slightly but continue to meet the traditional p < .05 (two-tailed)
[Vol. 28:71116
Show Me the Money
standard. Cases in which the majority declared an action unconstitutional
continues to be significant at the p < .05 (two-tailed) level.
Overall, the model performs substantially better than the baseline model
and the partisan whistleblower model too. The log likelihood falls to -1306
(i.e. a 26 point reduction from the whistleblower model and a 70 point
reduction from the baseline model). The increase indicates that when
controlling for the effects of ideology on dissenting behavior, it is better to
use these nuanced continuous ideal point measures than the dichotomous
identifiers used in the whistleblower model. With that in mind, we will
continue to use these two ideological controls in the remaining two model
specifications.
M. ISSUE TYPE MODEL RESULTS
The issue type specification is found in the middle column of Table 4
and it adds control variables related to more controversial issue types: 1)
criminal; 2) civil liberties and rights; and 3) federalism/miscellaneous. After
controlling for these different issue types, the key independent variable that
identifies controversial labeled judges remains insignificant. For the first
time in these different model specifications, however, the parameter value is
in the expected positive direction. The standard error of the estimate is
greater than the parameter value, suggesting the result is uninformative with
respect to direction or magnitude. The policy proponent thesis continues to
fall short when subjected to empirical tests.
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The three new variables controlling for issue type are robust predictors
of dissent direction. Parameters show that appeals involving criminal issues
and civil liberties and rights issues are significantly (p < .001 two-tailed)
more likely to be associated with an ideologically consistent dissent. The
parameter controlling for federalism and miscellaneous issue types does not
reject the null hypothesis, suggesting they are not distinguishable from the
null category of labor and economic regulations issue types. These findings
suggest that the judges dissenting in cases raising hot-button criminal or civil
liberties/rights cases are more likely to take dissenting policy stances that are
consistent with a priori partisan expectations.
The interactive issue type variables either fail to reject the null or run
counter to the policy proponent theory. The interactive variables associated
with criminal and civil liberties/rights cases are both insignificant and offer
no support for the premise that controversially labeled judges are somehow
unique. The interactive variable associated with federalism and
miscellaneous issue types provides the sole evidence that controversial
labeled judges may be systematically different than their matched pair
cohorts. The parameter result is negative and marginally significant at the p
< .10 one-tailed standard. However, the negative direction of the estimate
suggests that these controversially labeled judges are less likely to be
ideologically consistent with partisan expectations in those issue areas. In
cases involving federalism and miscellaneous issues, these controversial
labeled judges are more likely to be writing dissents that are ideologically
neutral or that run counter to partisan stances. This result represents the only
inferential evidence that would support the group maintenance theory of
interest group opposition. The result suggests that controversial appointees
are less likely to be ideological outliers within certain narrow issue areas.
The result is marginal in terms of strength, but it clearly does not support the
policy proponent or fire alarm oversight view of interest group appointment
conflict.
The inclusion of the issue type controls does not disturb results
associated with the ideological disparity of the three-judge panel nor the
distance between the dissenting judge and the panel median. Both remain
positive and significant at the p<.001 (two-tailed) level. In both instances,
the parameter value increased suggesting that issue controls help refine our
understanding of ideological context on the panel.
On the other hand, the inclusion of the issue type controls tends to
eliminate the effectiveness of the rest of the baseline model controls. With
the inclusion of the issue type controls, none of the baseline model results
hold. Each control for origin, question type, amicus participation and
unconstitutional holdings is no longer significant. The resulting substantive
conclusion, then, is that issue type and ideological context are the core
predictors of dissent direction and consistency. This aspect is clear, as the
issue type model specification performs better than any other specification.
It is the one that minimizes the likelihood function at -1249, which is a
substantive improvement from the previous ideology specification it is based
upon. In sum, this is a well-performing model that leads to the conclusion
that dissenting behavior is impacted by ideology and issue type and not by
being labeled controversial. Even when the controversial label has some
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borderline effect-federalism and miscellaneous cases-the direction is
opposite of expectations. This model does not confirm the policy proponent
theory of interest group opposition. The results continue to be more
consistent with the group maintenance theory of group opposition, here they
are marginally significant at least in terms of a narrow subset of federalism
and miscellaneous issue types.
N. SUPREME COURT ELEVATION MODEL
The final model is set out in the right hand column in Table 4. The model
addresses the question of whether judges who are labeled controversial act
strategically and suppress dissents because they seek to position themselves
for elevation to the Supreme Court. The hypothesis in this instance is that
dissents could harm their chances of being nominated or confirmed to the
next level. The first thing that stands out in this model is the lack of
significance, yet again, of the controversial variable. The standard error term
exceeds the parameter coefficient, and the parameter value reverts to being
negative.
The new variable evaluating changes in the dissenting behavior of judges
over time shows no strength. The standard error is greater than the parameter
value, providing no conclusion related to temporal maturation of dissent
consistency. The interactive term between the controversial label and the
temporal control again produces a null result for the policy proponent theory.
The standard error term exceeds the parameter value here as well. Therefore,
we find no evidence that the number of years on the bench affects the
dissenting behavior of judges generally or when controlling for controversial
labels. The lack of a significant finding, while not conclusive, casts doubt on
the proposition that judges are suppressing ideological dissents until later in
their tenure when the hope of elevation to the Supreme Court has passed.
The ideology and issue control variables remain unchanged with one
exception. The panel effects variables remain significant at the p < .001 level
with essentially the same coefficient values. The issue controls for criminal
issues as well as civil rights/liberties remain significant at the p < .001 level,
while the federalism/miscellaneous issue control now is significant at the p
< .001 level and has a negative coefficient value meaning that judges are less
likely to dissent in the ideologically expected direction in those cases.
Overall, however, this model performs well but not quite as well as the
issue type model. The addition of the temporal dissent control results in an
increase in the likelihood function makes the model perform marginally less
well than the issue type model (i.e., a two-point increase from -1249 to -
1251). The Wald value associated with the overall model continues to be
significant at the highest p < .001 level.
On the whole, the lack of any temporal pattern in the dissenting behavior
of the sample of judges does call into question the hypothesis that judges are
consciously altering their dissent activity to insulate themselves from future
group opposition. Considering these findings along with the issue type
model, we find that judges are dissenting in the expected direction in certain
high-profile issue types, but that the ideological positions taken in dissenting
[Vol. 28:71120
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opinions are not contingent upon the anticipation of elevation or past
opposition to a judge as being an ideological outlier.
0. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
The findings of this empirical analysis raises clear challenges to the
premise that interest groups are efficaciously engaging in policy evaluation
for senators. The simple fact is that the quantitative evidence does not
support the hypothesis that interest groups are motivated to label nominees
as controversial because those nominees are valid ideological outliers.
In this analysis we have presented graphical analysis of matched pair
dissent activity, negative binomial event count estimations of the likelihood
of dissent, and an ordered logistic regression of ideological position taking
in dissenting opinions. In the aggregated evidence of dissenting behavior, the
non-controversial judges actually dissented more often than the controversial
matched pair. This counterintuitive result held when incorporating into the
analysis the issues types such as criminal procedure and civil rights and the
ideological distance of the members of the panel-where you would expect
controversial judges to be the most active.
The analysis then moved from describing the dissenting behavior to seek
inferences about the likelihood of issuing a dissent. Controlling for the
ideological makeup of the dissenting judge, the circuit, and the Supreme
Court, the results of these models were not conclusive. We found no
systematic difference in controversial judges' dissenting patterns within
aggregate dissent counts, dissents in civil liberties cases, dissents that were
consistent with a priori partisan policy positons, or when the dissenting
judge was in a minority whistleblower situation. In short, because of the lack
of such findings, we must instead accept the null hypothesis that there is no
systematic difference in the dissenting activity of controversial and non-
controversial judges. These null findings are generally consistent with group
maintenance hypothesis and run counter to the premise that interest groups
targeted these appointees on the basis of ideological extremity.
The final quantitative analysis performed modeled the likelihood of
these judges taking ideologically consistent policy stances within their
dissents. After running five different model specifications, the results
suggest that there was no systematic difference in the dissent behavior of
controversial labeled judges versus otherwise similar matched pair judges.
The models clearly show that ideological composition of the USCA panels
and underlying issue types of appealed decisions affect the ideological
consistency of dissenting opinions. They do not show that previously
obstructed judges are somehow unique or different.
While we are limited in what we can infer from these findings, the results
raise substantial questions about the validity of the policy proponent theory.
Interest groups' strategies in obstruction is best described as "mix and
match"-interest groups appear to be looking for any ad hoc reason to
successfully oppose a nominee to the USCA. Typically, groups will focus on
ideology if they cannot find a non-policy based justification for opposition.
Such an approach would explain the lack of significant findings for the
dissent behavior of controversial labeled judges. Groups obstruct when the
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political context seems most conducive to the defeat of a nominee because it
establishes a valuable credit claiming opportunity. While ideology may be
one factor in that calculation, it certainly is not the most important and these
groups do not appear to be prospectively capable of identifying outlier
behavior for those nominees that are able to overcome their opposition and
reach the USCA bench.
V. CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence does not yield any robust evidence of a
systematic relationship between interest group opposition of judicial
nominees and their subsequent dissent activity upon the USCA bench. In
fact, to the extent that marginal evidence does exist, it points in the opposite
direction - controversial labeled nominees appear more likely to hold their
pens. This suggests that the vetting of nominees conducted by interest groups
is not particularly valid in terms of identifying ideological outliers.
The group maintenance framework would suggest that the identification
of ideological outliers is not really all that critical to those interest groups
participating within the judicial appointment process. Instead, it emphasizes
that groups participate in order to seek out opportunities to score points and
claim credit when the targeted nominees succumb to obstruction and
gridlock. The above results would be supportive of that premise. Whether
looking at the raw number of dissents associated with opposed and
unopposed nominees, the likelihood of issuing a dissent, or the ideological
consistency of observed dissents, we find no evidence that interest group
opposition can be tied to substantive differences in judges' behavior.
There is no doubt that we are limited in what we can infer from these
findings. However, these results raise substantial questions about the validity
of the policy promotion theory that underlies the current literature on interest
group involvement in the judicial appointment process. Our results also raise
significant questions about the benefit of interest group involvement in the
confirmation process of federal judges. This evidence suggests that interest
groups are not conducting an effective vetting function for senators, but
rather seem to be using the confirmation process as a mechanism for gaining
publicity and expanding membership and group resources. That proposition
would suggest their participation in effect undermines the constitutional
Advice and Consent obligation placed upon the Senate and that some
nominees are needlessly pushed aside for ulterior motives.
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